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Keynesians (or Kaleckians) refuse the methodology of static equilibrium and its implications. Two good general reasons may be invoked for that rebuttal. The first is that the economy is monetary in essence. The second is the asymmetry of the relations between entrepreneurs and other people (wage-earners typically). Moreover, the investment decisions of the entrepreneurs (in fact the expenditure of current expected profits) are made, not on the basis of the current profitability, but on that of the prospect of future profits. "We must not forget that, in the case of durable goods, the producer's short-term expectations are based on the current long-term expectations of the investor; and it is of the nature of long-term expectations that they cannot be checked at short intervals in the light of realised results" (Keynes General Theory p. 51). In other terms, the investment is not related to other decisions for the current period (nor are the receipts of the entrepreneurs in the equipment sector).
To sum up, the coordination relating to the investment expenditures, which gives sense to Keynes' hypothesis, is quite different from that attached to the notion of equilibrium and reminds us that the market does not exist but as a consequence of the impossibility of coordinating a priori the actions of the individuals.
Concerning the factor costs expenditures, the argument is quite different. We shall limit ourselves to the case of wages (interest payments are the consequence of prior commitments and do not raise any problems of mutual acceptance) which are the main factor cost (the sole considered in the model below).
It must be emphasized that nominal wage is not determined on a market in the ordinary sense of the term. The collective bargaining between entrepreneurs and wage-earners may bring about a wage-scale, a wage level or some kind of price-indexation but never a determined level of employment! 18Price'V is determined not ttquantityV8. Trying to save the idea of a labor market by 'saying that labor supply is infinitely inelastic in relation to nominal wage is not the best way to take into account the fundamental asymmetry between entrepreneurs and wage-earners.
We must recall here our central theme, namely the executability of economic plans or decisions. The possession of money or the access to credit is the general prerequisite for being able to undertake economic actions. Now wage-earners are such precisely because they are not able to work on their own account and to be autonomous agents carrying out their own plans. They cannot benefit from credit creation*. They need money and the only way of getting it is to be waged.
The payment of the wages in this sense does not require a mutual acceptance since people are not on the same footing. In order to capture this idea the term of ranport salarial has been coined and elucidated in different ways3. Here too we have to inquire into the conditions of execution of these plans. In the model below these difficulties will be overlooked in order not to obscure the main point: in any case, whatever these secondary adjustments may be, they do not modify the current level of employment nor the amount of investment. Here again we find the recursivity of the system.
For the sake of simplicity we shall suppose that entrepreneurs issue perpetuities "on tap". The idea is that long term indebtedness is always preferable to short term indebtedness to banks. Workers can thus always realize their desired transactions in bonds.
CC> It must now be emphasized that the realization of desired actions more or less independently of their mutual compatibility has a counterpart: the final outcome mav be hishlv undesirable and, at least, involuntary. This is, of course, a marked contrast to equilibrium.
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In a monetary economy the form taken by this is very clear and precise: some of the entrepreneurs (or all) experience a deficit.
Others may realize positive balances. Some cannot repay to the banking system the money they had raised for financing their expenditures. They may incur bankruptcy. The theoretical problems raised by the settlement of the balances are too complex to be discussed here5. We shall suppose instead that, within certain limits, it is always possible to make the excess agents finance, directly or indirectly, the deficit agents. Whenever such a spontaneous finance cannot take place a lender of last resort has the option to solve or not to solve the problem.
In the'latter case it is possible to speak of a major crisis, in that some fundamental rules of the game have to be changed (think of the Gold
Standard for instance or of the entire structure of the financial system).
In the former case, that of spontaneous finance, the system may be in a state of viability, which means that the current rules of the game are not put into danger'.
We have seen that the banking and financial system plays a central role at the two ends of the economic process. cd> The preceding developments enable us to do the following:
(i) To elaborate effective dynamic processes which are not simple virtual paths towards static equilibrium (see the Walrasian tatonnement). All the points of these effective paths will be observable situations (if included in the viability set)
interesting for their own sake: if stable, these paths will lead the economy towards an equilibrium. Equilibrium is then defined in a dynamic sense as the limit point of an orbit. It may or may not coincide with the static one according to the shape>of the dynamic system (path effects are the rule in non linear models).
(ii) To examine anew the problem of the relation between investment and saving. In the framework sketched above, it is perfectly clear that investment and saving are "merely different aspects of the same thing" (Keynes General Theory p.74) even in effective situations out of equilibrium (that is to say viable).
If p1 and wN are, respectively, the investment and the factor cost, pC the consumption expenditures, saving, defined as the excess of income over consumption is another name for investment.
Profits are equal to the excess of receipts (pI+pC) over the costs (wN) and are the saving of the entrepreneurs (by definition they do not consume).
If we add to this saving that of wage-earners (equal to wN-pC) we find the investment.
This identity is impossible to fit into a theory dominated by the notion of equilibrium. There is a natural room for it as soon as the concept of viability has been substituted for equilibrium. But this implies not only a change in words but a change in theory, namely the elucidation of the coordination of individual actions in a monetary economy with a raooort salarial.
II THE MODEL \ \
Let us assume an oversimplified one-good economy with two groups of agents, entrepreneurs and workers, and a banking and financial system. The latter is reduced to a lender of last resort which fixes exogeneously the rate of interest and provides entrepreneurs with the quantity of the means of payment they need through credit creation. Entrepreneurs have to repay the credit at the end of the period.
Entrepreneurs determine their investment expenditures for the period according to the familiar equation:
(1) p1 = LT -er where LT is the state of long term expectations exogeneously given and r the rate of the interest depending on the banking system. They settle their current level of activity wN on the basis of their short term expectations. As we know part of these are the consequence of (1) (7) D = p1 + wN -p1 -pC -pG The deficit is equal to workers' saving minus public deficit.
If we suppose that entrepreneurs do not wish to be indebted to the banking system, the condition of not incurring insolvency is that the deficit be totally financed through the perpetuities issues.
Assuming public deficit pG is always financed by bonds, it is easy to check that the condition of solvency of the entrepreneurs is given by the constancy of the deposits of the workers, that is: (W wN = (g/f)r Using (l), this condition may be expressed as a relation between wN and p1:
(S) wN = (gLT/ef) -(g/ef) p1 One is tempted to solve the system ISLM or the system RS. Doing so, one finds the set of values for r, wN and p1 which are compatible with the simultaneous fulfillment of the two conditions, relating respectively to the rentability (R) and to the solvency (S) -These values are:
In the traditional methodology of static equilibrium the meaning of (8) The plane is thus divided into four regions dependent upon the signs of the unexpected differences in rentability and solvency. These differences have no effect during the period on the value of p1 and wN. It is, however, quite natural to think that they have an influence on the decisions of entrepreneurs in future periods.
It is on such basic considerations that a very simple dynamic model may be built.
In regions 1 and 3 rentability and solvency considerations are acting in the same direction: the change of the current activity will be unambiguously positive (region 1) or negative (region 3). In regions 2 and 4 the two influences are of opposing signs and the outcome will depend on the relative strength of the influence of rentability and solvency: the current activity may ch .ange positively or negatively according to the weight of the two 15 influences.
In order to formalize very simply this idea, we shall assume that the change in the state of short term expectations of the entrepreneurs depends on the observations of unexpected results in the following way:
where B is the variation of the indebtedness with the banking system, equal to M.
The form adopted in (9) is very simple. It guarantees+owever that, even if P = Pe, the financial position of entrepreneurs piays a role in the motion of the economy over time (this would not be the case if the two factors were combined in a multiplicative manner)'.
Since dwN/dt = (l/m) dR/dt we get, substituting P, Pe and B
for their values in (5a), (6) and (4):
+ (l/m) (k,pG+k,gr) The general solution of (10) where wN* is the stationary solution of (10) and wN,,, an initial condition. wN* will indicate the limit point of (lo), if stable.
It will be an equilibrium situation in the dynamic sense. The stationary solution is:
It is easy to check that the path generated by (*) is stable: when t tends to infinity, wN(t) tends to wN*.
It is worth noticing that wN* will differ in general from the wN+ solution of the ISLE model. The economy will not tend towards the static equilibrium E but towards one of the noints of the line ST which depends on the value of the exoqeneous rate of interest.
The shape of ST is positive if we suppose that the rentability motive acts stronger than the solvency motive, as is done in schema 1. wN* is a weighted average of wN given by (R) and wN given by The equilibrium is restricted to entrepreneurs (effective demand principle) so that nothing is implied for the workers (except that N =< E where E is the amount of labour). The asymmetry between workers and entrepreneurs has as a consequence the incapacity of the workers to effect a change in such situations (through purely economic actions). If the level of activity wN* is such that, at the current level of wage w, more than N* workers are willing to be waged there will be involuntarv unemplovment.
Nothing can cure that unemployment (the price is endogeneous as shown in the appendix) except a public policy (either by changing the rate of interest or by augmenting pG).
There is The legitimacy of this approach is beyond doubt, but the validity of its conclusions depends heavily upon a proof of the stability of the equilibria compared. This proof is so rarely supplied that one may think it is not even necessary...
In the framework proposed here there is no danger of overlooking the point since the stationary state wN* cannot be reckoned independently of the dynamic system and of the intensity of the different forces at work (k, and k2).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with economic policy issues. What follows is just for the sake of methodological purpose. Two cases will be examined which differ according to the rule adopted by the lender of last resort. Let us suppose first that the lender of last resort is concerned with the solvency of the banking system.
If we admit that the normal activity of the banks is to provide entrepreneurs with a sufficient quantity of means of payment" and not to finance unexpected deficits, every increase in the loans to entregreneurs (at the end of the period) not only diminishes the solvency of the entrepreneurs but that of the banks as well.
In that case the lender of last resort has to raise the rate of interest in order to prevent a further decrease,in the solvency of the banks. This rule is reversible and the rate of interest would be lowered if entrepreneurs were able to be creditors of the banking system (whenever they experience high levels of bonds subscription). Formally:
(11) dr/dt = k, B = k, (fwN-gr) As dpI/dt = -e dr/dt [see equation (l)], the system which describes the path of the economy is:
+ (l/m) (k,pG+k,gr) The stationary solution of (Sl) is nothing but the wN+ and pI+ which is the same as the static equilibrium of the ISLM model. This conclusion is quite natural since the rule followed by the monetary authority is congruent with the satisfaction of condition
The rate of interest ceases to vary when the solvency of the entrepreneurs is granted.
As (10) is stable and under the influence of the rentability motive, wN* will be equal to wN+. Moreover, it appears that (Sl) is stable12. A comparative statics analysis would have given the same result: replacing r by r+ in the static system formed by (R) and (S) would obviously give wN+ and pI+.
Incidentally, it should be noticed that no stationary solution of (lo), except for r=r+, makes the long term expectations compatible with the short term ones.
It is therefore necessary that the monetary authority intervene by adjusting the rate of interest. Without this action the rate of interest has no equilibrium value from a Keynesian point of view13.
A second example can be studied wherein the lender of last resort attempts now to drive the economy towards a predeterminate financial structure, say a fixed profits/investment ratio a*. It will raise (decrease) the rate of interest if the observed P/p1 is below (above) a*. Formally, the economic policy is:
(12) dr/dt = -k,(P -a*pI) Accordingly, the dynamic system is now, (replacing P$ by its In general the stationary solution of (S2) will differ from , (Sl) since the stationary rate corresponding to rule (12) is not equal to r+ except by chance for a particular value of a*14. It appears here that economic policy aims cannot be determined on purely normative grounds.
The rule (12) fails because it is not relevant for entrepreneurs. They do not take, in this model, the P/p1 ratio into consideration. This simple case is an illustration of the difficulties of shaping a "structuraltt economic policy.
Furthermore system (S2) is stable or unstable depending on the value of the parameters. All things being equal, the stronger the action of implementing a * (that means k4 high) the greater the risk of instability15. It is the same for the intensity of the entrepreneurs' reaction to variations in the rate of interest.
This second example shows how irrelevant it may be to study economic policy with comparative statics only. Kalecki's degree of monopoly theory is not very satisfactory since, according to its author, it seems independent of any maximizing behavior of the entrepreneur. "In view of the uncertainties faced in the process of price fixing it will not be assumed that the firm attempts to maximize its profits in any precise sort of mannert116.
However, it is well known that it is possible to make the determination of the mark up the outcome of the maximization of profits.
Let us consider the entrepreneur i. He has to decide the price pi and the current level of the activity wNi. His constraints are the technique of production,given by:
(a) qi = xiNi and the proceeds he expects to get from his decisions. It seems sensible to assume that the share yei of the anticipated market Rei the entrepreneur expects to get depends on the price pi as compared with the average price pei he thinks the market will exhibit. The higher the ratio pi/pei the smaller his market share. Note that pei may differ from one entrepreneur to another. For the sake of simplicity we shall retain a linear negative relationship between yei and the ratio (pi/pei):
(b) Yei= ui -'(Pi/P",) with 0 < z -C ui < 1
The expected profits of entrepreneur i are then:
(c) Pei = [Ui -z (Pi/P'i) lRei-(qi/xi)w
